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Abstract
Database activity monitoring (DAM) systems are com-
monly used by organizations to protect the organiza-
tional data, knowledge and intellectual properties. In
order to protect organizations database DAM systems
have two main roles, monitoring (documenting activity)
and alerting to anomalous activity. Due to high-velocity
streams and operating costs, such systems are restricted
to examining only a sample of the activity. Current so-
lutions use policies, manually crafted by experts, to de-
cide which transactions to monitor and log. This limits
the diversity of the data collected. Bandit algorithms,
which use reward functions as the basis for optimization
while adding diversity to the recommended set, have
gained increased attention in recommendation systems
for improving diversity.
In this work, we redefine the data sampling problem as
a special case of the multi-armed bandit (MAB) prob-
lem and present a novel algorithm, which combines
expert knowledge with random exploration. We ana-
lyze the effect of diversity on coverage and downstream
event detection tasks using a simulated dataset. In doing
so, we find that adding diversity to the sampling using
the bandit-based approach works well for this task and
maximizing population coverage without decreasing the
quality in terms of issuing alerts about events.
Introduction
Databases are at the heart of organizational IT infrastruc-
ture. For data security, privacy protection, and data leakage
prevention, many organizations monitor database operations
in real-time using database activity monitoring (DAM) sys-
tems. Such systems are widely used to help implement se-
curity policies, and detect attacks and data abuse. The multi-
billion dollar Google-Waymo vs. Uber case 1, in which the
data collected (and more specifically, data activity logs) was
used to document data theft, provides a good example of
DAM system use and the value of such a system to an orga-
nization.
With information overload of hundreds of thousands of
transactions per second, database activity monitoring sys-
tems cannot process and log all of the activity into log files.
1https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/22/did-uber-
steal-googles-intellectual-property
Instead of logging all transactions, DAM systems use poli-
cies to decide which transactions to save, which are based
on rules and users / activity groups defined by the SO during
the system setup.
Policy changes require a lot of manual effort, resulting in
a situation in which policies rarely change once they are de-
fined. Furthermore, the system primarily monitors users that
match the security officer’s (SO) implicit or explicit prefer-
ences very closely, and this restricts them from discovering
concept drifts (such as changes in users’ roles).
This static approach may cause the “filter bubble” phe-
nomenon in which SOs (the users of the DAM system)
are trapped in a subspace of options that are too similar
to the defined risk profile,thereby losing the ability to ex-
plore beyond what they already know. Such filter bubbles
are a known issue for recommendation systems (Nguyen et
al. 2014; Chen et al. 2019).
To address this challenge, we suggest incorporating the
concept of diversity from recommendation systems (Matt et
al. 2014) into logging policies. Unlike search engines or rec-
ommendations, sampling a more diverse group of users is
not technically complicated as the user’s transactions risk
can be aggregated to a single score (Grushka-Cohen et al.
2016; Evina et al. 2019). However, logging capacity is con-
strained, and by focusing solely on diversity, undocumented
malicious activity in the high risk group can be missed. A
solution must provide a balance between the exploration of
activities and users suspected to be of low risk with the ex-
ploitation of activities and users suspected to be of high risk.
The effect of sampling has been studied in the domain
of anomaly detection systems of network traffic monitoring
and DAM (Juba et al. 2015; Jadidi et al. 2016; Jadidi et al.
2015; Grushka-Cohen et al. 2017). These studies found that
policy based sampling introduces bias to the down stream
anomaly detection systems and suggested specific sampling
strategies for avoiding bias.
Multi-armed bandits (MABs) are strategies used for pol-
icy setting based on sampling for decision-making (Agrawal
and Goyal 2012; Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002).
To the best of our knowledge, MABs haven’t been used
so far by an anomaly detection system to set data collec-
tion policy. Since auditing and anomaly detection system
can only learn and model the data available to it, the policy
determining which transactions are logged has great influ-
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ence on the ability to detect anomalies, and which anoma-
lies can be detected, and what actions would be possible to
audit later. MABs are used for balancing exploration and
exploitation in order to maximize a reward in many do-
mains, including reinforcement learning and recommenda-
tion systems. In the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem,
the goal is to maximize the reward from a slot machine
with multiple arms. Various strategies for balancing explo-
ration/exploitation have been studied (Agrawal and Goyal
2012).
In this work we suggest viewing the diversity problem for
DAM system sampling strategies as a MAB problem, where
the risk of the transactions logged is used as the reward func-
tion.
Unlike the classic MAB problem, in this special case, the
risk distribution of a user is not static: it may change natu-
rally when a user changes his/her role, or it can change due
to hacking or malware, or when an employee has been com-
promised. Another difference is that in each round we are
not sampling one user’s activity but sampling multiple users
to monitor, i.e. multiple arms are pulled in each round (the
collector logs all of the transactions for a list of users).
We define a novel variant of the MAB problem to incor-
porate capacity, pulling multiple levers in each time frame,
with a reward function which may change, named Budget-
Constrained-Dynamic-MAB. We present a novel sampling
strategy for sampling Budget-Constrained-Dynamic-MAB,
a variant of the –Greedy algorithm, named C––Greedy.
Using simulated data-sets created with (Grushka-Cohen
et al. 2019), we assess the effect of diversity on sampling
policies. We introduce two evaluation measures: (i) cover-
age of user activity, i.e., how much do we know about each
user in the population, and (ii) downstream effectiveness in
identifying anomalies.
Using these measures, we compare a number of strong
baselines and show that the proposed algorithm outperforms
oracle-knowledge policy sampling and the Gibbs-prior sam-
pling approach suggested in (Grushka-Cohen et al. 2019).
The novelty of our work lies in adding diversity as an im-
portant objective of monitoring and redefining the monitor-
ing problem as a bandit problem, as well as in showing that
a variant of a classic bandit sampling algorithm can improve
existing approaches.
Background and Motivation
Database Monitoring
Monitoring database and file activity enables organizations
to issue alerts when dangerous events have occurred, and
database monitoring is implemented in many domains, in-
cluding health, finance, and insurance. Security informa-
tion and event management (SIEM) and DAM systems audit
database activity and apply anomaly detection algorithms in
an attempt to detect data misuse, data leakage, imperson-
ation, and attacks on database systems. These systems are
used by an organization’s SO to identify suspicious activ-
ity (Kaplan, Sharma, and Weinberg 2011). Unlike recom-
mendation systems where the users modeled are also the
ones receiving the recommendation, in DAM settings the
aim model the database users’ activity in order to make rec-
ommendations for the SO regarding which users should be
monitored.
When monitoring only users suspected of preforming
risky activity without exploring and diversifying the mon-
itored user list, the SO can only learn about the ”normal be-
haviour” of a small group of users without getting a sense of
what is normal for the majority of users and activities.
Transaction Risk
When an SO assigns risk to a transaction, various contextual
information is used, such as time of day, user activity pro-
file, location (IP address), the nature of the activity (i.e. is it
permitted), data sensitivity, and the resulting data volume.
When a DAM system is installed in an organization these
rules can be defined manually (by the SO) as a risk policy
or learned by annotating risk scores on some representative
transaction using a classifier such as CyberRank (Grushka-
Cohen et al. 2016).
This allows for the aggregation of the overall user activ-
ity and the assignment of a single risk-score for user activity
within a time-frame. Methods for aggregating this are out of
scope of this work, but simple aggregations such as maxi-
mum or median risk during a particular hour, can be used.
Increasing diversity when sampling for monitoring
The problem of data velocity and size when monitoring sys-
tems is not limited to the DAM domain, nor is the filter
bubble effect. Studied conducted in the domain of network
traffic flows such as (Jadidi et al. 2016; Mai et al. 2006) at-
tempted to diversify the monitored data while maintaining
the ability to detect malicious events. Mai et al. (Mai et al.
2006) found that for network flows the attempted sampling
schemes weakened the anomaly detection ability to identify
abrupt changes in volume - the sampling schemes degraded
the performance examined in terms of success detection and
false positive ratio. Kumar and Xu (Kumar and Xu 2006)
suggested approximating the size of the traffic flow as a prior
for the sampling probability, using count sketch for guiding
the sampling method to estimate flow traffic measurement.
These studies found that sampling only high-risk packets
is deleterious for anomaly detection and that sampling intro-
duced bias to the recalls of the anomaly detection.
DAM Sampling as a Multi Armed Bandit Problem
The problem of maximizing reward when sampling in the
MAB problem has been extensively explored (May and
Leslie 2011; Agrawal and Goyal 2012; Chen, Wang, and
Yuan 2013). In multi-armed bandit problems, the optimal
sampling (exploration / exploitation) strategy of playing
against a slot machine with N arms each with an unknown
reward distribution, is sought.
In the data-base monitoring domain, the goal is to find the
optimal strategy for sampling users’ database transactions,
using the available resources in order to maximize risk mon-
itoring. This does not fit the classical MAB setting as we are
pulling multiple levers in every round. The scenario of mak-
ing multiple actions at each round with a constraint on bud-
get had been recently described by (Zhou and Tomlin 2018)
as Budget-Constrained MAB with Multiple Plays. However,
in our case the reward distribution for each arm may change
during the game and the rewards are not sparse as some
reward is gained from every armed pulled (unlike vanilla
MAB problems where most actions result in no reward).
We name this MAB variant Budget-Constrained-Dynamic-
MAB.
Once we redefine the security sampling problem as a
MAB problem we can define the sampling algorithms in
MAB terms of exploration and exploitation and use reward
as the objective, aligned to the task of maximizing the col-
lection of informative and useful logs.
Problem Setting
We address the problem of diversifying the list of users
who’s transactions are being monitored based on the need
of the system to monitor and capture all potential malicious
activity, and the need of the SO to learn about the differ-
ent users activity. Hence, we define the learning to diversify
problem for database activity monitoring along with maxi-
mization of risk ”reward” subject to the available storage and
computing capacities. We now create a few notations to ex-
plain the problem. Let’s consider a policy pt at a certain time
iteration t ∈ {0, ....,∞} monitors St subset of the system
users U = {u1, ..., un} whos risk scores for time t are given
by {r1, ...rn}. Our goal is to select the best policy pt (A sub-
set of users from the n users) for each time-frame t such that
the result set caters to maximizing the monitored risk score
subject to the given capacity C. Let us use indicator vari-
ables xjt = {0, 1} denotes if the user uj is selected by pol-
icy pt to be monitored during time-frame t, and zjt = {0, 1}
denotes if the user uj is selected by the oracle policy ot to be
monitored during time-frame t . The reward generated from
the policy pt can be computed as ρt =
∑j=n
j=1 xjtrjt. The
reward proportion rt for time t can be computed by
Rt =
ρt∑j=n
j=1 zjtrjt
The total reward can then be given by RT =
∑t=T
t=1 Rt.
Given the above set up learning to diversify problem in
Database activity monitoring can be mapped to maximizing
RT for a given capacity C without degrading the Anomalies
found.
Each users activity is either fully monitored or fully dis-
card.The anomaly detection aims to detect advanced persis-
tent threat (APT) (Tankard 2011). a single risk score for the
users’ time-frame activity lines up with these goals.
Evaluation
In this study, we use the following metrics to evaluate the
performance of sampling algorithms from the perspective of
risk detection, coverage, and malicious events detected:
• Reward The main objective of the sampling strategy is to
maximize the monitored risk . The oracle strategy, detects
the maximal risk ρopt =
∑j=n
j=1 zjtrjt for a given capacity
at time t. The reward for a time-frame is the proportion of
the detected risk out of the oracle strategy detected risk:
Rt =
ρt
ρoracle
• Coverage Anomaly detection systems rely on historical
data in order to detect anomalies. Therefore acquiring risk
profiles for as many users as fast as possible is highly im-
portant, also for avoiding the cold start problem. If we
never sample the users suspected to be a low risk users the
anomaly detection wouldn’t be able to detect a change in
their activity. Moreover, the SO perception of the user’s
risk profile may be inaccurate or just missing. We mea-
sure how long does it take the system to collect data re-
garding the entire population. Therefore, we measure the
percent of the population for which the sampling algo-
rithm logged at least one time frame of activity. Let us
define users coverageti = {Ut | t ∈ {1, ..., ti}} where
Ut is a list of all users monitored during time t
• Recall of anomalies Downstream of the logged data,
anomaly detection is applied to user activity. Previous
work (Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar 2009) found that
sampling adds bias to the results of the anomaly detec-
tion. We measure the recall of an identical anomaly de-
tection algorithm when applied to the different data sets
produced by each sampling strategies. We normalize the
recall to the recall discovered by applying the anomaly
detection over the full data set (no sampling).
Sampling algorithms
We compare three algorithms for the problem. The first
two baseline algorithms proposed in (Grushka-Cohen et al.
2019). We introduce a novel algorithm named C––Greedy
based on -greedy algorithm for the Budget-Constrained-
Dynamic-MAB problem.
SO-policy
In each round, the C users with the highest known risk are
sampled (these remain constant as no exploration is per-
formed). Initialization is explained in the Experimental set-
tings section.
Gibbs-by-risk
In the Gibbs-exploration strategy, suggested by (Grushka-
Cohen et al. 2019), the user probability to be sampled is
proportional to the risk estimate.
Algorithm 1 Gibbs by risk
Data: U = {u1, .., un}, Rt−1 = {r1,t−1, .., rn,t−1}, C > 0
Result: list of users for time t
1 monitor users ={}
2 for u in {u1,...,un} do
3 pu = rui/
∑N
i=1 rui
4 end
5 while len(monitor users) ≤ C do
6 draw ui with probability pi ∼ (p1, ...pn)
7 if ui /∈ monitor users then
8 monitor users.append(ui)
9 end
10 end
Sample randomly with a user’s risk profile as the prior for
choosing it. The user’s probability to be sampled is deter-
mined by the maximal user′s risk found in the past (using a
sliding window of k time frames) or the initialization value.
C--greedy
The –greedy strategy for MAB has been shown to outper-
form other algorithms on most settings (Kuleshov and Pre-
cup 2014). Thompson sampling, another top performing al-
gorithm for MAB, is not applicable to the non-discrete na-
ture of Budget-Constrained-Dynamic-MAB. In our setting
we present C––Greedy strategy, where in each step the
 × C (capacity) users with the highest risk are sampled,
and (1 − ) × C random users are sampled as well for ex-
ploration.
Algorithm 2 C--greedy
Data: U = {u1, .., un}, Ri,t = {r1,1, .., rn,n}, C > 0, k >
0
Result: list of users for time t
11 monitor users ={}
12 for ui ∈ U do
13 aggriskui =
∑T
t=T−k rui,t
14 pui = aggriskui/k
15 end
16 sorted users← sort(((u1, p1), .., (un, pn)), desc)
17 i = 0
18 while i < × C do
19 monitor users.append(sorted users[i][0])
20 i+ = 1
21 end
22 i = 0
23 while i < (1− )× C do
24 draw j with probability U ∼ (1, .., n)
25 if sorted users[j][0] /∈ monitor users then
26 monitor users.append(sorted users[j][0]) i+ = 1
27 end
28 end
The SO-Policy can be viewed as a special case of the
C––Greedy Strategy where the exploitation is set to 100%.
Random sampling
A baseline where users are sampled completely randomly at
every time frame. This can be viewed as a special case of the
C––Greedy Strategy where the exploration is set to 100%.
Simulating DAM monitoring data
Using data collected from an operating DAM system is irrel-
evant in our case mainly because it contains bias introduced
by the process of the data collection; Due to the high velocity
nature of database activity, it is impossible to log all the ac-
tivity, therefore the data collected using a sampling policy,
hence contains bias. Other reasons we worked with simu-
lated data: (1) The logged data may contain organizational
Intellectual property (IP) and sensitive data and as such it is
hard to convince commercial organization to share it. (2) Se-
curity events are not tagged in the logged data, therefore for
each suspected activity a consultation with SO is needed.
Verifying that the activity is malicious requires manual in-
vestigation of the activity and it’s context making it imprac-
tical for research purposes. Using simulated data allows us
to evaluate the effect of the sampling strategy using all the
evaluation metrics described above.
Collecting meaningful and unbiased data sets for study-
ing effects of diversity and comparing sampling strategies is
also a problem in other domains (Chen et al. 2019; Lupu,
Durand, and Precup 2019) such as search and recommenda-
tions, using simulated data instead allows for flexible and ro-
bust experimentation (Goswami, Zhai, and Mohapatra 2019;
Chen et al. 2019; Germano, Go´mez, and Le Mens 2019;
Voelkl et al. 2018).
DAM systems log various features for each user trans-
action, using the data as is makes evaluating log coverage
and anomaly detection more complex as it is not a trivial
task. To reduce the complexity of the features for compar-
ison and evaluation, working with aggregated data is use-
ful. Previous work such as (Grushka-Cohen et al. 2016;
Evina et al. 2019) leveraged SO knowledge to aggregate
database activity into a single risk score. (Grushka-Cohen
et al. 2019) suggested a simulation package made of low
complexity data where the user activity for a time frame is
represented by a single aggregated risk score. Using simu-
lated data also helps us with avoiding the bias introduced
to the data set during the collecting stage and the ability to
introduce anomalies in a controlled fashion.
The simulation is designed to mimic the properties of real
users whose behavior is not random: users exhibit power log
distribution of risk profile, few users produce most of the
risky transactions, and transactions per user over time have a
trend (see (Grushka-Cohen et al. 2019)). Before implement-
ing our experiment we consulted a security expert to confirm
that the simulated data matches the expected behaviour as
observed in real data-bases activity.
Figure 1: Risk distribution. Risk sampled per user over
time produced by the simulation, two of the users have an
anomaly introduced
Experimental settings
We used the simulation to produce 10 data sets using differ-
ent random seeds and report on the average results. Each
data set simulates activity profiles of 200 users for 3,000
time frames. The capacity (C) was set to 10% of the numbers
of users.
Initialization
The setup of a DAM system relies on the SO’s acquaintance
with the databases users as well as his/her familiarity with
the domain potential risks. During the setup process the SO
defines a monitoring policy made of rules and user groups
which represent the users and activities suspected of being
the main threats to the organization’s data. To examine the
effect of that knowledge over the quality of the monitoring
and anomaly detection and to assess whether the results of
the SO’s manual efforts, can be leveraged as a prior for the
cold start scenario we compare two settings:
(1) A setting in which there is oracle initial knowledge
- This setting assumes that the SO, defining the policy, has
perfect knowledge. To mimic this knowledge we sample the
risk for each user at time t0 and use it as the risk prior. (2)
A setting in which there is a noisy oracle - this settings as-
sumes that the SO has imperfect knowledge about the users’
activity and the risk they present to the organization. In such
cases, we use the risk from time t0 mixed with noise from
another randomly generated user (risk distribution) as a risk
prior for each user.
Introducing security events
The anomaly detection component of DAM systems relies
on modeling users’ activity and detecting activities that are
incompatible with that distribution. To evaluate the effect of
the sampling strategy on the anomaly detection component,
we simulated security events. A security event, in which a
user has been compromised or abused his/her permissions,
is continuous (lasts more than a single time frame) and char-
acterized by a change in the user’s risk distribution.
To simulate such an event we change the user’s risk distri-
bution, sampling a new risk distribution randomly for a pe-
riod length l which is sampled uniformly between 200 and
300. In each time frame, a user has a probability of experi-
encing such an event (set at 0.001 for these experiments).
Figure 1, presents the activity of five different users from
the users generated by the simulator. Each line indicates
the users’ hourly activity risk score. The graph presents one
high-risk profiled user (user 82), two medium-risk profiled
users (users 2 and 59), and two low-risk profiled users (users
136 and 54). User 82 experienced a security event beginning
at the 414 time frame. User 136 experienced a security event
between the 143 to 441 time frames. In the figure it can be
seen that user 143 started of as a low risk user, this user’s
activity profile changed to a medium-risk profile during the
security event, while user 82 had a high-risk profile to begin
with and the security event exacerbated this, resulting in an
even higher-risk profile for this user.
Figure 2: Risk Reward per Time Frame
Controlling diversity
To evaluate the effect of different amounts of introduced di-
versity we tweak the  part of the C––Greedy algorithm.
When  is 1 only the highest risk users are sampled and no
exploration is happening, this is essentially the SO-policy
baseline. Setting  to 0 means the system is in pure explo-
ration mode, sampling users at random. 3 other settings are
evaluated: setting  to 0.2 (sample 80% of capacity at ran-
dom), setting  to 0.5 (sample 50% of capacity at random
and 50% from the highest risk users) and setting  to 0.8
(sample only 20% of capacity at random),
Results
Performance
Table 1 presents the performance for the reward and recall
metrics when using the various sampling strategies. As can
be seen, the C––Greedy sampling strategy, with exploration
set at 20% or 50% ( set at 80% or 50%) out-performed all
of the other strategies. C––Greedy, with exploration of 20%
( set at 80%) performed the best in terms of reward, with
reward of 86%. when initialized With a perfect SO knowl-
edge (assuming the SO has the right estimation of all the
users activity during setup) the SO-Policy of sampling only
the riskiest users achieved a 67% of the optimal reward,
however when the initialization is noisy (imperfect expert
knowledge at system setup) the result degraded to 51% of
the reward while the C––Greedy methods did not degrade
significantly. Figure 2, which describes the reward achieved
in each time frame, shows that the C––Greedy sampling
strategy both with the 80% / %20 exploitation / exploration
ratio and 50% / 50% exploitation / exploration ratio, out-
performs all other strategies, while random sampling con-
stantly results in the poorest performance. In the figure, we
see that C––Greedy 80% (using 20% random exploration)
takes about 100 time frames to explore, discovering the most
risky users and then exploiting gaining 20% better reward
than C––Greedy 50%. At time frame 460 we see another
event where a change in the user population, a non-risky user
affected by an anomaly that made it emit high risk transac-
tions, cause both C––Greedy 80% and 50% to experience a
drop in reward, the reward goes back up once the offending
user is discovered and added to the exploitation list.
In terms of anomalies recall, the SO-knowledge policy de-
tected only 8.5% of the anomalies, not surprising as only
Table 1: Reward and Recall for sampling strategies
Strategy Reward (detected risk, Oracle SO) Reward (with Noisy-Oracle SO) Recall (detected anomalies)
SO policy 0.677 0.514 0.084
Random 0.264 0.264 0.878
Gibbs by Risk 0.514 0.39 0.56
C––Greedy 0.2 0.479 0.48 0.834
C––Greedy 0.5 0.703 0.702 0.779
C––Greedy 0.8 0.864 0.863 0.67
10% of the users are ever monitored. The highest recall was
found for random sampling detected 88% of the anomalies.
The C––Greedy sampling strategy detected between 67%
to 83% of the anomalies. Gibbs-by-risk sampling got signif-
icantly less recall with 56%.
Coverage experiment
In figure 3 we compare the coverage of the different algo-
rithms. On the x axis we shows the time and the Y axis
shows the corresponding coverage.
We marked a user as ”covered” when the method gathered
two samples of the user.
The SO-policy always samples the same group of users,
therefore it is constant from the beginning as no other users
are explored. With Gibbs-by-risk method there’s a probabil-
ity for any user to be sampled in proportion to their risk. We
observe that users who exhibit low risk in initialization are
not likely to be sampled which slows down the exploration
of all users (not all users were sampled even after 3,000 time
frames).
The strategies preferring completely random exploration
had faster knowledge acquisition, depending on the propor-
tion of the sample capacity devoted to exploration. When
sampling with a 100% exploration rate (completely ran-
dom), 80% exploration (epsilon 0.2), or 50% exploration
the strategy had gathered two samples for most users by the
100th time frame. Dedicating 20% of the capacity to explo-
ration (epsilon 0.8) requires∼ 250 time frames for the same
amount of knowledge acquisition.
Figure 3: Knowledge acquisition rate
Figure 4: Reward vs Recall as a function of exploration rate
Anomaly detection recall vs. reward
Figure 4 shows that anomalies recall improves as we in-
crease the exploration rate. However, the highest exploration
rate yields low reward.
Conclusions
In this paper, we explored the effects of diversity when sam-
pling activity for monitoring. We formulated the problem
of sampling transactions in the security domain as a MAB
problem, introducing Budget-Constrained-Dynamic-MAB,
a multi-armed bandit where in each time-frame we sample a
number of arms defined by the capacity of the system. As a
user’s risk profile may change when they switch position or
become compromised, the reward probability may change
during the user’s life cycle. We extended the –Greedy algo-
rithm, one of the best performing MAB approaches (Chen,
Wang, and Yuan 2013), to Budget-Constrained-Dynamic-
MAB. Our variant, C––Greedy splits the sampling capacity
at each turn into exploration part and exploitation part.
Using simulated data sets of user activity we showed that
ensuring diversity when sampling database activity is im-
portant for understanding user behavior (coverage) and en-
hances downstream anomaly detection without adverse ef-
fects from allocating some capacity to diversity.
The C––Greedy strategy that used 20% of the capacity
for exploration was able to beat a strong oracle-policy base-
line on collecting risky activity, while achieving good cover-
age of all the population. The baseline method of a constant
policy did achieve fine results on reward, collecting logs of
risky activity, but was sensitive to initialization (depending
on the SO familiarity with all the users). C––Greedy having
better coverage allowed it to identify users becoming riskier,
achieving better reward overall and was immune to bad ini-
tialization.
We found that recall is driven by the exploration part of
the strategy, and that completely random exploration had the
best recall but worst reward (most of the logging capacity
was spent on non-risky activity).
Therefore, we advise using methods for sampling that al-
low the SO to dedicate some capacity for exploration and
diversity. We find that the The C––Greedy strategy is easy
to implement, the  is an easy knob to turn for enhancing
exploration when needed, it supports initialization with the
SO knowledge avoiding cold start and keeping humans in
the loop while maximizing the audit trail for all users and
supporting robust anomaly detection downstream.
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